- There is a significant gap between what digital tools detect and what tax administrations in Latin America and the Caribbean ultimately collect.
- The primary driver of this gap is weak enforcement: when enforcement lacks credibility, taxpayers adapt their behavior accordingly.
- Addressing this challenge requires institutional, not technological, solutions. Governments must strengthen legal frameworks, build enforcement capacity, and adopt cost‑effective compliance strategies.
Las herramientas tributarias digitales están generando resultados concretos para las administraciones tributarias de América Latina y el Caribe (ALC). En Brasil, un programa que recompensa a los consumidores por exigir facturas aumentó la recaudación neta en un 9,3%. En Costa Rica, correos electrónicos de fiscalización de bajo costo produjeron mejoras en el cumplimiento que persistieron en el tiempo y se extendieron a otras empresas. La evidencia es clara: estas herramientas funcionan.
Sin embargo, la evidencia también revela una brecha llamativa entre lo que detectan las herramientas digitales y lo que los gobiernos finalmente recaudan. Las primeras experiencias en la región ilustran este desafío de manera contundente. En un caso bien documentado en Ecuador, las herramientas digitales detectaron en promedio alrededor de US$187.000 en ingresos no declarados por empresa, pero en última instancia solo se recaudaron aproximadamente US$1.850 por empresa. La región ha aprendido mucho desde esos primeros ejercicios.
La pregunta ahora es: ¿cómo cerramos la brecha que aún persiste entre la detección y la recaudación?
Las herramientas digitales son notablemente eficaces para detectar el incumplimiento tributario
Dos tipos de instrumentos digitales han demostrado ser especialmente efectivos en la región: los sistemas de facturación electrónica y la información de terceros.
La facturación electrónica aprovecha una tensión inherente al impuesto al valor agregado (IVA). Bajo este esquema, las empresas pagan impuestos sobre sus insumos y los cobran sobre sus ventas. Los vendedores tienen incentivos para subdeclarar las ventas, mientras que los compradores quieren declarar las compras para reclamar créditos.
La facturación electrónica genera un registro en tiempo real y trazable de estas transacciones, lo que permite a las autoridades tributarias cotejar declaraciones y señalar discrepancias. Un estudio sobre la implementación gradual en Perú muestra que estos sistemas aumentan consistentemente las transacciones declaradas y reducen los costos de cumplimiento para los contribuyentes (1).
Las estrategias de información de terceros, en las que las autoridades tributarias utilizan registros digitales de bancos, empleadores u otras empresas para verificar declaraciones, han demostrado ser igualmente eficaces, incluso para impuestos distintos al IVA. La evidencia de Chile y Costa Rica confirma que estas herramientas revelan grandes brechas entre lo que los contribuyentes declaran y lo que realmente adeudan (2). La capacidad de detección es sólida en distintos tipos de impuestos y países. En síntesis, la detección ya no es el cuello de botella.
Table: Summary of Evidence on Digital Tax Tools in Latin America and the Caribbean
| Topic | Potential Tax Increases | Taxpayer Offsetting Adjustments | Country |
|---|---|---|---|
| Electronic billing and reporting system | Tax base: $3,820 per firm Tax revenue: $2.53 billion | Adjustment in reported expenses | Brazil |
| Tax base: $7,810 Tax revenue: $0 | Offset via existing VAT credits | Peru | |
| Tax base: $506 Tax revenue: $298 | Offset via existing VAT credits | Peru | |
| Electronic payment of taxes | Tax base: $0 Tax revenue: $0 | Uruguay | |
| Use of information (third-party reporting) | Tax base: $16.8 Tax revenue: $2.7 | Chile | |
| Tax base: $804 per firm Tax revenue: $482 per firm | Costa Rica | ||
| ↑ 22 p.p. filling rate, of which ↑ 4.8 p.p. prob. positive net liability Tax revenue: $15-$18 per firm | Offset via cost deductions with firms declaring zero in their liabilities | Costa Rica | |
| Tax base: $5,852 per firm out of $187,358* Tax revenue: $1,851 per firm out of $39,736* | Offset via cost deductions: "other administrative costs" and nonresponse | Ecuador | |
| Effectiveness of massive auditing systems** | Tax base: $1,229 per firm Tax revenue: $429-$1,486 per firm | Brazil | |
| Tax base: $1,417 per firm Tax revenue: $1,347 per firm | Adjustment via composition of taxable revenue | Brazil | |
| Tax base: $3,580 per firm Tax revenue: $2,577 per firm | Brazil |
IDB staff calculations based on Naritomi (2019); Bellon, Dabla-Norris, Khalid, & Lima (2022); Bellon, Dabla-Norris, & Khalid (2023); Brockmeyer & Sáenz Somarriba (2025); Pomeranz (2015); Brockmeyer & Hernández (2016); Brockmeyer, Hernández, Kettle, & Smith (2019); Carrillo, Pomeranz, & Singhal (2017); Café, Yarygina, & Escalante (2024); Bando Grana, Canozzi, Martínez, & Dezolt (2021); Yarygina, Iketani, Martínez, & Tiburcio (2025). Columns show: (i) Tax revenue increase – the net increase in tax revenues resulting from digitalization; (ii) Tax base increase – the expansion of the tax base, i.e., the portion of economic activity subject to taxation; (iii) Taxpayer offsetting adjustments – adjustments made by taxpayers that may reduce the net effect on revenues. *Estimates correspond to the hypothetical scenario in which no offset occurs, and all firms respond. **A massive auditing system involves cross-checking information from declarations and payments with other sources (both internal and third-party), notifying taxpayers of irregularities, and providing an interface to either regularize inconsistencies or dispute the notification.
Why Detection Alone Is Not Enough
In high-income economies, detecting noncompliance and enforcing the tax code tend to go hand in hand. In LAC, where state capacity is more constrained, these are distinct challenges. Tax authorities may identify a discrepancy but lack the resources or legal authority to follow up with every taxpayer. And taxpayers notice.
When enforcement is not credible, taxpayers adapt. The evidence documents a consistent pattern: firms that are caught underreporting revenue respond by inflating their reported costs, effectively offsetting the detected liability. In Chile, the VAT paper trail's deterrent effect was limited where enforcement was not perceived as credible. In Ecuador, firms claimed additional costs and, in many cases, simply did not respond to notifications—accurately judging that authorities could not pursue everyone. Studies that examine digitalization without complementary enforcement consistently find only modest increases in net revenue.
Closing the Gap: Legal Frameworks, Institutional Capacity, and Calibrated Strategies
Turning detection into sustained revenue gains requires more than better technology. It requires strengthening the institutional ecosystem around it—on at least three fronts.
First, legal frameworks matter. When notifications to taxpayers lack legal force, response rates are predictably low. Evidence from Ecuador found that only 10-20% of notified firms filed amended returns, but the region is adapting. Ecuador itself has since introduced a legally binding taxpayer mailbox (casillero fiscal) on its tax administration portal, giving electronic notifications a legal standing. Countries need to ensure that digital detection is backed by legally binding notification procedures and realistic enforcement pathways. Without this, even the most sophisticated detection system produces little more than a list of discrepancies.
Second, institutional capacity is essential. Technology alone cannot substitute for the organizational structure, trained personnel, and operational systems that tax authorities need to act on what digital tools reveal. A tax administration that can detect noncompliance but cannot process, follow up on, or adjudicate cases will see limited returns on its digital investments. Building this capacity, from staffing and training to internal processes and IT infrastructure, is as important as the technology itself.
Third, enforcement strategies should be calibrated to taxpayer size and risk profiles. Studies conducted under Brazil's PROFISCO program illustrate this well: when testing different enforcement approaches on micro and small firms, assisted regularization — where tax auditors directly help taxpayers correct their records — was the most effective intervention, but also the most resource-intensive. Therefore, its use may be more appropriate for relatively larger firms within the micro and small business segments (3).
Simpler, lower-cost interventions like messages had weaker effects on these firms but were more cost-effective for the smallest taxpayers. This points to a fundamental tradeoff: the most intensive enforcement tools tend to yield the largest compliance gains, but their cost limits how widely they can be applied, requiring careful cost–benefit analysis.
For smaller taxpayers, lower-cost digital interventions can still be powerful. In Costa Rica, enforcement emails targeting non-filing firms increased payment rates and amounts paid, with effects that persisted over time. Critically, treated firms became more likely to report transactions with other firms, creating positive spillovers that facilitated future enforcement. The key is matching the intensity of the intervention to the taxpayer profile, maximizing the fiscal return from limited enforcement resources.
Digital interventions can also deliver benefits beyond immediate tax revenue gains. Evidence from Uruguay’s electronic VAT payment system finds no significant increase in collections, but a marked shift toward credit and debit card payments. By reducing incentives to avoid traceable transactions, tools such as electronic invoicing can generate positive spillovers—supporting financial deepening and broader technological diffusion.
The Next Frontier
Our analysis shows that, while technology is effective at detection, much more is needed to translate this information into increased tax revenues. Closing this gap is therefore not a technological challenge, but an institutional one.
The challenge now lies in building legal frameworks, organizational capacity, and calibrated enforcement strategies. Equally important, tax administration personnel must be trained to use these tools effectively because even the best technology delivers little if the people operating it are not equipped to act on what it reveals.
There is no universal blueprint. Every country operates within a distinct institutional capacity, legal framework, and economic environment, and solutions must be tailored accordingly. What works for large firms in Brazil may not apply to small taxpayers in Costa Rica. That is precisely why rigorous evaluation, experimentation with new tools, and a willingness to adapt based on results are so essential. The countries that will make the most of their digital investments are those that commit to continuous learning: testing what works, measuring the impact, and adjusting course as they go.
References
(1) For additional information on Peru the table also includes: Bellon, M., et al. (2022).
(2) For Chile look at: Pomeranz, D. (2015). For Costa Rica look at: Brockmeyer, A and Hernandez, M, (2016). For additional information on Costa Rica the table also includes: Brockmeyer, A., et al. (2019).
(3) For additional information on Brazil the table also includes: Bando, R. et al. (2021), and Yarygina, A., et al (2025).