Table 4.3

Independence of the Judiciary
Country
Judicial Independencea
(1-7 scale)
De Facto judicial independenceb
(0-1 scale)
Argentina
1.80
0.33
Bolivia
1.70
0.56
Brazil
3.90
0.49
Chile
4.60
0.58
Colombia
3.10
0.53
Costa Rica
3.80
0.92
Dominican Republic
3.60
-
Ecuador
1.90
0.39
El Salvador
2.90
n.a.
Guatemala
2.20
0.53
Honduras
1.90
-
Mexico
3.30
0.71
Nicaragua
1.60
0.32
Panama
2.20
0.39
Paraguay
1.40
0.49
Peru
1.90
0.16
Uruguay
4.80
0.45
Venezuela
1.20
0.40

- not available.

a The World Economic Fourm. This variable is the average response of surveyed business executives in each country to the statement "The judiciary in your country is independent from political influences of members of government, citizens of firms" (1=no, heaviliy influenced; 7=yes, entirely independent)

b Feld and Voigt (2003). The de facto judicial independence index of Feld and Voigt is based on objective criteria such as actual tenure of supreme court justices, deviations from de jure tenure, removal of jutices before end of term, increases in number of justices on the court, adn changes to the budget of the supreme court and to real income of justices, among other things (see Data Appendix).

Sources: World Economic Forum (2004); Feld and Voigt (2003).