Table 4.1
Factors Affecting the Role of Subnational Actors in Policymaking| Institutional features | Argentina | Brazil | Colombia | Mexico | Venezuela |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Federal Structure | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes |
| Extent of fiscal resources available to governors |
High | High | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Territorial chamber | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No |
| Malapportionment | High | High | Moderate | Low | Low |
| Are legislative elections concurrent with elections for governors or presidents? |
Partial with governors and presidents | Yes; in 1986 and 1990, with governors; after 1994, with presidents and governors | Neither | Neither | Yes until 1999; only very infrequently with one or the other thereafter |
| Do legislative districts coincide with regions or provinces? |
Yes | Yes | Only chamber | Only senate | Yes |
| Do governors play major role in the nomination/election chances of legislators? |
Yes | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| Can governors reward legislators with positions? |
Yes | Yes | No a | Yes | Yes |
| Are governorships launching platforms for successful presidential campaigns? |
Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes, since 1990s | Yes, since 1990s |
| a Mayors of major cities in Colombia tend to have more resources with which to reward legislators than governors do. Source: Authors’ compilations. |
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