# COMMENTS ON MANAGERS' MOBILITY, TRADE PERFORMANCE, AND WAGES

BY G.MION AND L.D.OPROMOLLA

Andrea Repetto

April 11, 2013

## TRADE AND HETEROGENEITY

- New empirical research based on microdata and new theories focusing on firms and products.
- Exporters relative to firms that produce for domestic markets
  - are larger,
  - are more productive,
  - use capital and skilled labor more intensively, and
  - pay higher wages.
- ► All this true even before their entry into international markets: entry costs and self-selection.

#### THIS PAPER

- Main findings:
  - Managers with previous export experience earn a wage premium relative to otherwise identical workers.
  - Aditional premium to export experience in export markets served by the current employer.
- Interpretation:
  - Previous export experience carries knowledge/reduces entry costs.
  - Premium is relevant only for those at the highest positions within the firm's hierarchy.
- ► In addition, higher observed average wages are mainly related to higher management wages only.

## MAIN EMPIRICAL CHALLENGE

- Treatment:
  - being a manager,
  - having acquired export experience and
  - moving to a firm that exports or to a firm that exports to specific markets.
- Main challenge: Heterogenous workers non randomly sort into heterogeneous firms.

Exogeneity condition

$$E\left(\varepsilon_{ift}\mid X_{it}, Z_{ft}, \eta_i, \eta_f\right) = 0 \tag{1}$$

- Mobility is random once controlled for
  - observed individual and firm characteristics and
  - unobserved time invariant individual and firm characteristics.

- ► What if job mobility is also determined by unobserved worker-firm match quality?
- Example: complementarities between workers' skills and firms' (heterogeneous) technology/productivity.
- More generally, models of directed search, learning and coordination frictions predict that job assignment depends also on match specific characteristics.

- Omitted worker-firm match quality may bias estimation results.
- ► For example, managers with export experience will end up in higher quality matches if their return to search is higher.
- ► Also, exporting firms may screen more intensively (Helpman et al., 2010)
- ▶ Ideally, use instruments...

- ► Control for unobserved match specific fixed effects, assuming they are time invariant.
- New exogeneity condition

$$E\left(\varepsilon_{ift} \mid X_{it}, Z_{ft}, \eta_i, \eta_f, \psi_{ift}\right) = 0 \tag{2}$$

(Firm and individual fixed effects can be omitted from the equation).

#### **OTHER COMMENTS**

- Non-manager heterogeneity
  - Non managers are heterogeneous.
  - The specifications pull together workers with very different skill levels.
  - Compares managers to this set of non managers.
- Manager heterogeneity I
  - Always a manager vs. now a manager (position at the previous firm).
- Manager heterogeneity II
  - Managers with export experience working in firms that export to any market (export status of the current firm).
  - ► Managers with trade experience, more generally, working in firms that trade in internatinoal markets.

# COMMENTS ON MANAGERS' MOBILITY, TRADE PERFORMANCE, AND WAGES

BY G.MION AND L.D.OPROMOLLA

Andrea Repetto

April 11, 2013